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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SALT LAKE CITY,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
V.

Case No. 20150755-CA
RAFAEL REYES-GUTIERREZ, :
Defendant and Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction to review this matter pursuant to Utah Code § 78A-4103(2)(e ).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue: The only issue on appeal is whether the trial court clearly erred in finding

that the prosecution did not intend to provoke a mistrial.
Standard of Review: "Because a trial court is in a better position to judge

credibility and resolve evidentiary conflicts, an appellate court reviews the trial court's
findings of fact for clear error." State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, <f{20, 144 P.3d 1096.
"Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial court's
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opportunity to judge the credibility of the witness." Utah R.Civ. P. 52(a)(4). Even though
some evidence may support error, a trial court's finding of fact is clearly erroneous when
the reviewing court "is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed" after reviewing the entirety of the evidence. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191,
193 (Utah Sup.Ct. 1987). The mere fact that the reviewing court might have reached a
different finding than the trial court does not justify a finding of clear error. Id. (citing
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §2585 (1971). Rather, the trial court's
findings should only be disturbed if the finding is without adequate evidentiary support or
is based on an erroneous application of the law. Id.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

1. Pretrial Proceedings and Discovery
The City agrees with Appellant's recitation of the pretrial proceedings regarding
the filing of charges and the preliminary hearing. See Br. Aplt. at 3-4. A jury trial was
scheduled for May 26, 2015. R.71-75. Approximately one week before trial, Melissa
Stirba, counsel for Reyes-Gutierrez, notified Brandon Simmons, the prosecutor assigned
to the case, that she was unable to view her copy of a Walmart surveillance video that had
been turned over during discovery on or about December 17, 2014. R.186. Until that
point, Mr. Simmons had not attempted to view the video himself. Id. It was then that Mr.
Simmons discovered that he had the same difficulties in playing his copy of the video. Id.
Simmons then made attempts but was unable to make the video function. Id. He
reached out to a Walmart loss prevention supervisor to obtain a new copy, but was
notified that, per Walmart procedure, the video had been deleted from their system. Id.
2
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Next, Simmons spoke with a property crimes detective who was familiar with Walmart's
system. Id. The detective did not have any suggestions on what could be done to make
the video function. Id. On May 21, 2015, Mr. Simmons emailed Ms. Stirba to notify her
that he was also unable to make the video function, and that he was unable to obtain a
new copy. R.187. The email also indicated that because of the issues with video, he
would not be seeking to introduce it at trial. Id. Ms. Stirba did not respond to the email.
Id.

2. May 26, 2015 Jury Trial
The first jury trial was held on May 26, 2015. The City was represented by Mr.
Simmons with Padma Veeru-Collings as co-counsel. Reyes-Gutierrez was present and
represented by Ms. Stirba. R.269. Prior to the beginning of the trial, Ms. Stirba moved to
bifurcate the proceedings, as the retail theft charge was being enhanced based on prior
convictions. R.269. A stipulation was entered into by the parties that if the Defendant
were found guilty, the Court would make a finding that Reyes-Gutierrez had two prior
qualifying convictions. R.270. During the defense's opening statement, Ms. Stirba told
the jury that it was not Reyes-Gutierrez's intent to remove merchandise from the store
without paying for it. R.366. Rather, she argued, the Defendant's failure to pay for the
merchandise was a "simple human error." Id. The City's first witness was Mr. Lendo, an
asset protection manager at the Walmart where the theft occurred. R.368. On crossexamination, Mr. Lendo testified that he was in the security office viewing monitors
when he observed the theft take place. R.377. Ms. Stirba then elicited testimony
regarding the ability of Walmart's surveillance system to record videos. Id. After several
3
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minutes of testimony, Ms. Stirba circled back to the video issue, asking whether
surveillance cameras can record, and whether Mr. Lendo brought a copy of the video
with him to court. R.387. Mr. Lendo responded that he did not, and that a copy was
submitted to the Salt Lake City Police. Id. Ms. Stirba confirmed with Mr. Lendo that he
did not bring a copy of the video to court, then moved on to other lines of questioning. Id.
On redirect, Mr. Simmons tried to address the video issue, asking Mr. Lendo if he
knows whether the recorded videos always function properly. R.393. Mr. Lendo
responded that they sometimes do not, and that the system is outdated. Id. Ms. Stirba then
re-crossed Mr. Lendo about the video again, and asked whether the videos can be saved
and preserved. R.395. Mr. Lendo answered in the affirmative. Id.
On further redirect, Mr. Simmons again attempted to address the video issue
elicited by Ms. Stirba, asking Mr. Lendo whether he was familiar enough with the
software that he could identify the video files on a disk. R.397. Mr. Lendo responded
with an extended "Umm ... " R.397. It was at that point that Mr. Simmons ended
questioning with Mr. Lendo. Id.
The City next called Officer Edmundson, a Salt Lake City Police officer who
investigated the theft. R.398. Simmons asked Officer Edmundson if he reviewed the
video from the incident. R.403. The officer stated that he did not recall whether he
reviewed it or not. Id. On cross examination, Ms. Stirba questioned Officer Edmundson
about whether Mr. Lendo had given him a copy of the video. R. 405. Officer Edmundson
replied that he had. Id. Ms. Stirba asked Officer Edmundson if he had brought that copy
to court. Id. The officer replied that he did not. Id.
4
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At the conclusion of Officer Emundson's testimony, the jury was excused for
lunch. R.409. Judge Trease then began discussing jury instructions and other matters with
counsel. Id. Mr. Simmons indicated that before resting his case, he would like to attempt
to develop some evidence regarding the non-functionality of the video. Id. After some
discussion regarding jury instructions, Mr. Simmons indicated his concern that the jury
may, at that point in the proceedings, have been led to believe that a video did exist, but
that the City had not provided it to the defense. R.414. Simmons stated to the Court, "it
would be appropriate to notify the jury that there is a video, the prosecution provided it to
the defense, neither side has been able to make it work." R.414-415. Mr. Simmons
recommended a jury instruction that would notify the jury about the video issues. Id.
Discussion ensued between the City and Judge Trease regarding what the jury may have
been led to believe regarding the video. R.415. Ms. Veeru-Collings clarified to Judge
Trease that the City's issue regarding the questioning elicited by Ms. Stirba was that it
seemed to suggest that the video was being withheld, and that perception may suggest
that the City had in some way acted improperly with regard to the video. Id.
Ms. Veeru-Collings expressed to the Court that City restrained from objecting to
the questions about the video in order to avoid further drawing the jury's attention to the
issue. Id. Thinking aloud, Mr. Simmons stated ''I also don't know that the appropriate
response is to call Ms. Stirba to ask her to testify about whether I provided her the video,
whether she was able to get it to work." Id; R.482. Judge Trease then expressed her
concern that the testimony did suggest things to the jury that may not be the case. R. 416.
Judge Trease agreed that the testimony gave her the impression that "there's some video
5
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

hanging out somewhere and nobody knows where it is or it was lost or whatever." R.416.
After some further discussion, Judge Trease indicated to the City that unless a jury
instruction was stipulated to, the City would have to present testimony if they wished to
address the video issue. Id.
The City indicated that it was simply requesting a jury instruction that "a video
was provided, that it's not working." Id. Mr. Simmons expressed his concern "that
otherwise I' 11 have to call Ms. Stirba to testify." R.417. Judge Trease responded that she
would allow the parties to discuss how they wanted to proceed, and that the parties could
stipulate, or in the alternative, that "you've got to do what you've got to do whether you
call each other as witnesses or whatever." Id. The judge stated to counsel, "So you figure
out what you need to do and again, it wouldn't be the first time that a lawyer has called
another lawyer who is on the case as a witness. If you need to you, can, you know,
address those things or you can deal with it by way of stipulation." Id.
The Court recessed for lunch. Ms. Stirba indicated to the City that she would
stipulate to a jury instruction as the City had requested. R.479. However, despite her
earlier indication that she would stipulate, Ms. Stirba changed her mind just minutes
before court resumed after the lunch break. R.425; R.482.
Upon learning that Reyes-Gutierrez would not likely take the stand, the City
addressed an issue regarding statements made by Ms. Stirba during her opening
statement. R.419. The City expressed concern with Ms. Stirba's statement that ReyesGutierrez had simply committed a "human error" in not paying for the merchandise, and
that it was not his intention to commit a theft. Id.; R.366. Mr. Simmons argued that Ms.
6
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Stirba seemed to introduce those statements in her opening as if they were fact, so either
the City should be able to present 404b evidence to rebut the assertion of mistake or
error, or in the alternative, that a mistrial may be appropriate. R.420.
Simmons argued his belief that Ms. Stirba's opening remarks had opened the door
for the City to rebut the claim of mistake by presenting 404b evidence of prior retail theft
convictions. Id. Mr. Simmons expressed concerns about being able to tell the jury that no
evidence was presented suggesting a mistake, for fear that such statements would result

~

in an impermissible burden shift. Id. He did not feel that any evidence had been presented
to support the theory, but the jury's mind had been opened to the idea nonetheless. Id.
Simmons pointed out that indeed, "the City has be very careful about what we say about
his [the Defendant's] decision not to testify ... " Id. Mr. Simmons requested that the court
allow him to present evidence of prior convictions, or that a mistrial may be appropriate.
Id.

Ms. Stirba responded that the opening remarks were not evidence that would open

~

the door to evidence of prior bad acts. R.421. Judge Trease agreed that the opening
remarks did not open the door, and that the jury would be instructed that remarks during
opening statement do not constitute evidence. Id. The Court found that there was no legal
necessity for the mistrial and denied any motion for mistrial on those grounds, as well the
introduction of any evidence of prior convictions. R.422.
The Court then put on the record that the jury had delivered several unsolicited
questions. Id. Ms. Stirba stated that she would like to see the questions. R.423. One of the
questions stated, "I would very much like to see the surveillance video (or still images).
7
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Is it available to watch?" R. l 00. Another questioned why, if the theft was a mistake,
Reyes-Gutierrez did not immediately indicate such to the loss prevention officer and
Officer Edmundson. R.101. Other questions also related to Ms. Stirba 's opening remarks
that it was a mistake. "Were the shoes in the same shopping cart as the other items the
defendant purchased?" R. l 04. "Did the defendant place the items he paid for on the
checkout stand?" Id.
Ms. Stirba then asked the Court to address the possibility of her being called to
testify about her knowledge of the video. R.425. She stated that it would be improper for
her to be forced to testify as a witness "against my own client," and indicated that she
would move for a mistrial if forced to testify. R.426.
Judge Trease responded that if the parties stipulated to a mistrial, that she would
grant the mistrial and make a record that double jeopardy would not attach. R.426. Judge
Trease stated that if she were a juror, she "might be convinced that there's some
videotape lurking out there that the City has not used. So it may be necessary for the City
to put on evidence about the videotape, that the videotape was turned over to the defense,
that it didn't work ... " R.427.
Both parties discussed with Judge Trease whether there were alternatives to
calling Ms. Stirba as a witness. R.428-429. Judge Trease noted that if an alternative
witness would not suffice, that although rare, it wouldn't be the first time a lawyer on a
case was called as a witness. R.429. Ms. Stirba reiterated that she would move for a
mistrial if she were called to testify. Id. The City clarified that any testimony would be
narrowed to the discovery issue; that the City provided Ms. Stirba with a disk that
8
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purported to be the video from the retail theft in question, and that the parties had prior
discussions about the video not working. R.432.
Judge Trease further addressed the appropriateness of putting on evidence to
address the discovery issue. She stated that based on the state of the evidence, "it is
wholly appropriate for one of you or both of you to put on evidence regarding what's
wrong with the video, where the video went and who knows whether the video works or
not. That's appropriate testimony to be brought in now that there's evidence that there is
a video." R.434. The judge reasoned that the notes from the jury proved that they wanted
to know exactly what happened at the checkout stand, and would certainly be curious
about the fact that they weren't being shown the video. Id.
More discussion ensued regarding whether a witness besides counsel could
G0

properly address the discovery issue. Ms. Stirba proposed the idea that the officer be recalled. R.434-435. Both Mr. Simmons and the Court agreed that the officer did not
sufficient knowledge to address the issue. R.435. After some discussion, Judge Trease
again indicated that she would allow Ms. Stirba to be called as witness unless she could
present someone else from her office that had knowledge regarding whether the defense
received the video and whether it functioned. R.437. Ms. Stirba again indicated she
would move for a mistrial. Id.
The City then stated that in order to avoid retrying the case, the City would call
Mr. Simmons rather than Ms. Stirba. R.438. Ms. Stirba then objected to Mr. Simmons
being called as witness. Id. Ms. Stirba argued that the video was not an element of the
crime, and therefore not relevant. Id. The Court responded that the video had become a
9
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relevant evidentiary piece, and reminded Ms. Stirba that she had questioned witnesses
about it on cross examination. R.438-439.
Finally, the City stated that at that point it had exhausted all means to try to
properly address the video, and that if Ms. Stirba still wished to move for a mistrial, that
the City would stipulate. R.440. In response, Ms. Stirba responded, "I think if you are
going to allow attorneys to be called as witnesses in this case then I am forced to move
for a mistrial." R.440-441. Judge Trease stated that she would allow Mr. Simmons to
testify. R.441. Ms. Stirba renewed her objection. Id. Mr. Simmons made clear that he
only intended to testify regarding the non-functioning video and that it had been turned
over to the defense. Id. Ms. Stirba again objected and moved for a mistrial. Id.
When asked if the City stipulated to the mistrial, the City indicated that it would
like to proceed, but based on the obvious impasse between the parties, the City would
stipulate. R.442. Ms. Stirba consulted with Reyes-Gutierrez, and confirmed that she was
moving for a mistrial. R.444. The Court ordered the mistrial and made a record that
jeopardy had not attached. R.445. Mr. Simmons indicated his intent to file a 404b notice
and a motion in limine to avoid the same problems at retrial. R.447. New dates were
scheduled and the Court adjourned. R.451.

3. June 29, 2015 Hearing on Defense Motion to Bar Retrial
On June 8, 2015, the City filed a Notice of Intent to Rely on 404b Evidence as
well as a Motion in Limine regarding evidence of the surveillance video. R.115-121. On
June 10, 2015, Appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Preserve Evidence and
a Motion to Bar Retrial on Double Jeopardy Grounds. R.124-149. The parties convened
IO
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for a hearing on the motions on June 29, 2015. R.474. At the hearing, Ms. Stirba
withdrew her Motion to Dismiss because her office was able to get her copy of the
surveillance video to function. Id. The City was also able to resolve the technical issues
with its copy of the video, and accordingly signaled its intent to withdraw its Motion in
Limine. R.476.

a. Testimony
Judge Trease, who had presided over the May 26, 2015 jury trial, also heard

~

testimony and evidence on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss/ Bar Retrial. During the
hearing, Mr. Simmons was placed under oath to give testimony regarding the first jury

~

trial and answer to the allegation that he intentionally provoked the defense into moving
for a mistrial. R.486. Both the Court and Ms. Stirba indicated that they would accept a
proffer, but Mr. Simmons asked that he be placed under oath and be subjected to cross
examination to give the Court the best opportunity to judge his credibility of his
testimony .. Id. Mr. Simmons testified that after the Court denied his motion to either
admit 404b evidence or declare a mistrial, it was his intention to finish the trial that day.
R.486. Mr. Simmons testified that his intention was to introduce evidence regarding the
~

non-functionality of the video and that it had been provided to the defense. Id. He
explained that when he initially expressed doubts regarding the appropriateness of having
Ms. Stirba testify he was merely thinking aloud, trying to determine the best course of
action. R.482. Mr. Simmons testified to his belief that no other witness could give
admissible, non-hearsay testimony about the video. R.487.

11
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Mr. Simmons further testified that it was clear to him, based on Ms. Stirba's
strong objections, that an appeal by the defense would be likely if either attorney were
allowed to testify. Id. He testified that his intention was to finish the trial that day, but
that he agreed to the mistrial based on how badly he perceived that the trial had broken
down and to an avoid a likely appeal. Id.
Mr. Simmons asserted that upon being forced into a mistrial, of course it made
sense to him to do things differently for the next trial, including filing a motion in limine
to prevent the video issue from arising. R.489. He also testified that he filed a 404b
Notice because he was now "leery of entering into a stipulation like we did the first time
with the evidence of prior convictions." Id.
Ms. Stirba then cross examined Mr. Simmons regarding the idea of sitting down
with the officer and having him attempt to make the video work. R.490. Mr. Simmons
responded that neither Mr. Lendo nor Officer Edmunson could appropriately testify
regarding the video because neither had any technical knowledge of the video, nor did
they know whether the video was given to the defense. R.490-491. "They just knew they
were clicking on files I had showed them and when they clicked on them, nothing
happened." R.491.
Next, Ms. Stirba questioned Mr. Simmons about her initial stipulation to the jury
~

instruction. Mr. Simmons agreed that Ms. Stirba changed her mind about the jury
instruction after reading the language that Mr. Simmons prepared. R.493. Mr. Simmons
testified that he tried to discuss alternate language with Ms. Stirba, but she simply said
"no, I won't stipulate." Id.
12

~
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Mr. Simmons reiterated on re-direct that neither of his witnesses had any personal
knowledge that the video did not work, nor did they know what efforts were made to
attempt to make the video work. R.502. In addressing his own motion for either a mistrial
or admittance of 404b evidence, Mr. Simmons stated whether or not he was right to make
the request, there was never " ... some sort of nefarious conspiracy or strategy" to trick the
defendant into a mistrial. R.503. Mr. Simmons declared, "Frankly, none of the strategy
and the manipulation that the defense proposes I was undergoing, it didn't even occur to
me to think in that way until it was proposed in the defense's motion." Id. Mr. Simmons
also attested that none of his decisions were based on any suggestion from co-counsel
that it would be better to simply try the case again another day in order to do things
differently. Id.

b. Court Findings
After hearing argument, Judge Trease denied Reyes-Gutierrez's motion to bar
retrial and found there was no evidence of anything "nefarious" on the part of the
prosecution, or any evidence the prosecution acted "in order to goad the defendant into
requesting a mistrial." R.507. Rather, the Court found that the City requested Mr.
Simmons be able to testify to provide information to the jury that the video was provided
to the defense, that efforts were made to make the video work, but that the video was not
functioning. Id. Regarding the relevance of the video, the Court found that evidence
regarding the status of the video was relevant because the inference could be made that
the police or the City had the video but were intentionally not showing it to the jury. Id.
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In concluding her findings on the issue, Judge Trease stated, "I think there are
frankly black shadows attributed to this case that are not there. I think this was a situation
where the attorneys and frankly the Court, were doing their best to address fast moving
issues ... and the lawyers were doing their best in a time where issues were arising, to
make the best decisions that they could ... " Id.

c. June 30, 2015, 2nd Jury Trial, Sentencing, Appeal
The parties reconvened for the second jury trial on June 30, 2015. Reyes-Gutierrez
was found guilty by the jury and sentenced. R.242; R.254-255. Reyes-Gutierrez filed a
timely appeal. R.257-258.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This court should affirm the District Court's denial of Reyes-Gutierrez's motion to
bar retrial on double jeopardy grounds because the trial court did not err in finding that
that the prosecution did not act in bad faith to "goad" the defense into moving for a
mistrial.
When a mistrial occurs upon defendant's own motion, the double jeopardy
protections of state and federal constitutions typically do not prevent retrial, even if the
prosecution or the court provoked the error. See State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221, 1232
(Utah 1998) (citing State v. Trafny, 799 P.2d 704, 709 (Utah 1990)). The narrow
exception to this rule is where a defendant's motion for a mistrial is brought about by bad
faith conduct on the part of the prosecutor or the court, and such conduct is specifically
"intended to provoke a mistrial as to afford the prosecution a more favorable opportunity
to convict." Id. Even in situations where prosecutorial conduct may be viewed as
14
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overreaching sufficient enough to justify a mistrial, such conduct "does not bar retrial
absent intent on the part of the prosecutor to subvert the protections afforded by the
Double Jeopardy Clause." Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 675 (1982).
In determining whether the prosecutor intended to provoke a mistrial, the trial
court makes findings of fact and infers the "existence or nonexistence of intent from
objective facts and circumstances." Id. A reviewing court reviews the trial court's
findings of fact for clear error, and must give due deference to the trial court's ability to
judge the credibility of the witnesses. See State v. Mendoza, 938 P.2d 303, 305 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997); Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).
Appellant's assertions that the City acted in bad faith to goad the defense into
moving for a mistrial is simply unsupported. Contrary to Appellant's assertions, a
thorough analysis of the record demonstrates that the City's intent was to provide the jury
with a correct understanding of the status and non-functionality of the surveillance video.
Questions elicited by Ms. Stirba on cross examination made the video a relevant issue,
and it was reasonable for the City to attempt to address any misperceptions the jury might
have had as a result of the testimony. The City's decision to stipulate to Appellant's
motion for mistrial rather than proceed with testimony from Mr. Simmons was to avoid
an inevitable appeal by the defense. The trial court was able to both observe the events as
they unfolded at trial and hear testimony from Mr. Simmons regarding the City's intent.
The trial court's findings were appropriate and should not be disturbed by this Court.
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ARGUMENT

I.

A Defendant Generally Cannot Bar Retrial On Double Jeopardy Grounds
After He Succesfully Moves For A Mistrial Unless The Objective Intent Of
The Prosecution Was To Provoke The Motion For Mistrial For The
Purpose Of Affording Itself A More Favorable Opportunity To Convict At
A Subsequent Trial

As set forth in Appellant's brief, the Double Jeopardy Clause generally does not
prevent the government from retrying a defendant when the defendant successfully
moves for a mistrial. See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982); State v. Rudolph,
970 P.2d 1221 (Utah 1998). A narrow exception to that rule exists "Only where the
governmental conduct in question is intended to 'goad' the defendant into moving for
a mistrial." Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 676. In Kennedy, the Court rejected a standard that
would examine whether overreaching or even bad faith conduct by the prosecution led
to the mistrial. Id. at 674.
In rejecting that standard, the Court was clear that the appropriate standard is one
that examines the intent of the prosecution as it relates to the mistrial. Id. Though a
standard that examines the intent of the prosecutor is not "entirely free from practical
difficulties," such "is a manageable standard to apply." Id. at 675. Where a defendant
attempts to prevent retrial on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct, the trial court
makes a factual finding and infers, from objective facts and circumstances, the
existence or nonexistence of prosecutorial intent to provoke a mistrial. Id.
Utah case law follows the principles set forth in Kennedy, establishing that where
a defendant successfully seeks a mistrial, he generally waives his double jeopardy
16
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protections, even in cases where the prosecution or court provoked the error. State v.
Trafny, 799 P.2d 704, 709 (Utah Sup.Ct. 1990); Rudolph, 970 P.2d at 1232. The

narrow exception exists only where "bad faith conduct by the judge or prosecutor is
intended to provoke a mistrial so as to afford the prosecution a more favorable

opportunity to convict." Id. (emphasis added).
II.

The Trial Court Did Not Commit Clear Error In Finding An Absence Of
Prosecutorial Intent To Provoke The Defendant Into Moving For Mistrial
Because The City's Intent Was Merely To Provide The Jury With
Accurate Facts And Information

In making her factual findings at the June 29, 2015 hearing on the defense's motion to
bar retrial, Judge Trease characterized the defense's allegations of intentional
prosecutorial misconduct as "black shadows" that simply did not exist. R.507.
Throughout the first jury trial, the prosecution simply sought to try the case and provide
the jury with accurate information, both regarding Reyes-Gutierrez's intent as well as the
status of the surveillance video. None of the City's tactical decisions were made with bad
faith intent to "goad" the defense into moving for a mistrial. Judge Trease acknowledged
in her findings that the first jury trial presented fast moving issues, and the attorneys, as
well as the Court, were simply doing their best to address those issues and make the best
decisions they could. R.507.

A. The City's decision to seek testimony from either Ms. Stirba or Mr.
Simmons was made only with the intent of providing the jury with a proper
understanding of the status of the video, which had become a relevant issue as
a result of Ms. Stirba's cross examination of City witnesses
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Despite Appellant's assertions to the contrary, a review of the record clearly
~

demonstrates that the City's intent throughout the trial was to provide accurate,
admissible information to the jury. There was no strategy or plan by the prosecution to
trick the defense into moving for a mistrial. It was quite clear to both the prosecution and
the Court that the testimony elicited by Ms. Stirba on cross examination of the City's
witnesses would certainly leave the jury with the impression that a surveillance video
existed, but was not being shown to them by the prosecution and had not been provided
to the defense. R. I 87; R.507.
The validity of the City's concern was bolstered by an unsolicited question given
to the Court by a juror. The question stated, "I would very much like to see the
surveillance video. Is it available to watch?" R. I 00. The video had become a relevant
issue in the trial as a result of Ms. Stirba's questioning during cross examination. Her line
of questioning was clearly intended to introduce to the jury the notion that the City was
withholding evidence from the jury and the defense, or in the alternative, that the
investigation and trial preparation was sloppy and mishandled. Such misperceptions
would be inaccurate and risked seriously jeopardizing the credibility of the City's case.
The Appellant asserts that Ms. Stirba's questions and the implications made by
them were fair game, and that the City should have been prepared in advance to present
evidence regarding why no video was being shown. 1 R.478; Br. Aplt. at 27-28.

1

Appellant's Brief refers to several cases in other jurisdictions as persuasive authority that her questions were
appropriate. However, the cases cited should be distinguished from this case. In State v. Reaves, 414 S.C.118, 128,
777 S.E.2d 213 (S.C. 2015), the questions related to a police investigation where evidence was lost or destroyed.
Here, the police officer acted appropriately, and the cause of the non-functioning video is attributed to a technical
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Regardless of whether or not the misleading line of questioning was appropriate, it was
reasonable for the City to be surprised at the line of questioning. The defense had been
notified that a technical issue would prevent the evidence from being introduced, so Ms.
Stirba's line of questioning appears to have been an attempt to mislead or confuse the
jury regarding the status of the video, which was simply not anticipated by the City. See
R.187.
Appellant refers to State v. Melancon, 2014 UT App 260, 'Il'Il18-19 2, for the notion
that a lawyer's testimony is not necessary when alternative options are available. Apl. Br.
25. The City did attempt to address the video misperception in several ways before
finally resorting to calling counsel to testify. Each method was either insufficient,
inadmissible, or objected to by the defense.
First, Mr. Simmons tried to address the video issue by questioning Mr. Lendo on
re-direct. Mr. Lendo could only state that the system was outdated and did not always
function properly. R.393. Mr. Simmons asked Mr. Lendo if he was familiar enough with
the software that he could identify the files on a disk, but Mr. Lendo was not able to say
that he could. R.397.
Because he was unable to elicit testimony from Mr. Lendo or Officer Edmundson
to correct the misperceptions regarding the video, Mr. Simmons requested that the Court
offer a jury instruction that there was a video, and that it was provided to the defense, but
that technical difficulties prevented it from being shown. R.415. Judge Trease's position

difficulty. State v. Barnes, 308 Conn. 38, 41-42, 60 A.3d 256 (Conn. 2013) is factually distinct from this case as well,
as the recordings at issue in that case were never provided to the defense.
2
In Melancon, the defendant sought to have the prosecutor disqualified to give testimony about plea negotiations.
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was that she could only offer the jury instruction if the defense stipulated. Id. Although
Ms. Stirba agreed that she would stipulate to a jury instruction prior to breaking for
lunch, she told Mr. Simmons minutes before court resumed that the defense would NOT
be stipulating. R.479. It should be emphasized that a stipulated jury instruction would
have prevented the need for any additional evidence to be introduced. Such a stipulation
would have avoided the need to even discuss the possibility of counsel giving testimony.
Because the City was led to believe that the defense would be stipulating to the
jury instruction, it was left with very little time to decide how best to proceed after
becoming aware that the defense had changed its mind about the jury instruction. In
discussion with the Court regarding how best to proceed, Mr. Simmons did state that he
didn't know that the proper alternative was to have Ms. Stirba testify. R.415. Mr.
'1b

Simmons clarified at the June 29, 2015 motion hearing that his statement was certainly
not an affirmation or belief that having Ms. Stirba testify would be improper, as
Appellant suggests, but that he was merely "thinking out loud" about how to best to
address the situation. R.482. Just moments prior to making the statement, the City
believed the jury instruction would be the cure. Mr. Simmons' statement is probative of
his intent to explore other reasonable alternatives to having counsel testify.
Unfortunately, no other alternative seemed viable at that point. The defense would
not stipulate to a curative jury instruction. Mr. Lendo had no personal knowledge
regarding the status of the video after he had given it to the police department. Officer
Edmundson had no personal knowledge regarding the status of the video after he booked
it into evidence. Mr. Simmons contemplated the prospect of bringing in someone else to

20
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

testify, but he simply couldn't think of anybody besides himself or Ms. Stirba that had
sufficient personal knowledge to give admissible, non-hearsay testimony. R.487. The
situation had become such that in order for the City to address the apparent
misperceptions resulting from Ms. Stirba's questioning, either Mr. Simmons or Ms.
Stirba would need to testify.
B. Both The City And The Court Believed That, Under The Circumstances,
Testimony From Counsel Was Appropriate

Based on the circumstances, the City felt that testimony from counsel was a
reasonable and appropriate course of action, as did the Court. R.429-441; R.486. Indeed,
"the basic purpose of a trial is the determination of truth." Brown v. La., 447 U.S. 323,
334, 100 S. Ct. 2214, 2223 (1980) (quoting Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S.
406,416 (1966). The City strongly believed that, since Ms. Stirba's questioning made the
video a relevant issue, it was important for the jury to be presented with the accurate facts
regarding the video so that they weren't left to consider partial or non-truths in reaching a
verdict. R.483. As discussed already, other options were explored but were either
objected to by defense counsel, or simply unworkable.
Appellant points to Rule 3. 7(a) of Utah's Rules of Professional Conduct and law
from several cases to argue that it was inappropriate for the City to attempt to call any of
the attorneys at witnesses. Apl. Br.24. Rule 3.7(a) states that "A lawyer shall not act as
advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness" unless certain
conditions are met. Utah R. Prof. Conduct 3.7 (emphasis added). The rule is intended to
prevent situations where an attorney is made a witness simply to disqualify that attorney
21
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from the case, and the testimony sought is unnecessary, duplicative, or obtainable from
other sources. See Melancon, 2014 UT App 260, <Jll5. The rule is also intended to prevent
an attorney representing a litigant from unnecessarily making herself a witness in the
litigation where other reasonable alternatives exist. See Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa &
Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 1065-1066 (Utah 1991 ). In Watkiss & Campbell, an attorney

representing a party to the action responded to the opposing party's affidavit for attorney
fees by submitting his own affidavit to challenge the reasonableness of fees. Id. The
Court noted that while testimony from the attorney was admissible, it was inadvisable
because another attorney not involved in the litigation could have easily been secured to
give testimony of standard billing rates for the region. Id.
Appellant's brief points to United States v. Torres, a Second Circuit case, in its
argument that counsel should not be called as witnesses. Torres states, "'lawyers
representing litigants should not be called as witnesses in trials involving those litigants if
such testimony can be avoided consonant with the end of obtaining justice."' United
States v. Torres, 503 F.2d 1120, I 126 (2d Cir. 1974) (citing United States v. Alu, 246

F.2d 29,33 (2d Cir. 1957)). (emphasis added). In Torres, the government sought to
impeach its own hostile witness by introducing testimony from one of the prosecutors on
the case that he witnessed a suspect courtroom encounter between the witness and the
defendant during a break. Id. at I 125. The Court found that it was inappropriate for the
prosecutor to testify, in part because the witness hadn't yet been asked about the
encounter on direct exam, and because there had been no showing that others in the

22
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courtroom, such as marshals, clerks, interpreters, or court reporters, could not give the
same testimony as the prosecutor. Id. at 1126
The circumstances in this case substantially differ from Watkiss & Campbell,
Torres, and others cited in Appellants brief. In each of those cases, testimony from

~

counsel was not the final reasonable option. Unlike in those cases, calling counsel to
testify in this case was the final resort after all other reasonable options had been
explored. A long discussion took place between the parties and Judge Trease to explore
alternate options. R.425-441. None of those alternate options were workable. Id.
Mr. Simmons elaborated on his belief that there were no other viable witnesses at

40

the June 29, 2015 motion hearing. He stated, "I guess the alternative would be to bring
Mr. Jorgenson (from the City Prosecutor's Office), but all he had done was spend a
~

couple of minutes trying to get it to work but all of his information about everything else
was based on hearsay." R.487. He asserted his belief that "Bringing someone else in that
only knew part of it wouldn't work." Id. Ms. Stirba mentioned at the trial that there may
have been someone else from her office that had tried to make the video work, but Ms.
Stirba would not disclose that person's identity. Id. Judge Trease indicated to Ms. Stirba
that if she could provide someone from her office that could testify, there would be no
need for counsel to testify. R.437
Both the City and the Court agreed there were no other reasonable alternatives.
R.487. Because no other options appeared to be viable, the City's request to allow
testimony from either Ms. Stirba or Mr. Simmons was consistent with the law cited in
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Appellant's brief, and was "consonant with the end of obtaining justice." Torres, 503
F.2d at 1126.

C.

The City's Decision to Stipulate to Reyes-Gutierrez's Mistrial Request was
Made to A void an Appeal, Not to Secure a Mistrial

It was clear to the City, from Ms. Stirba's strong and repeated objections to any
testimony from either Mr. Simmons or from herself, that an appeal would be inevitable if
either attorney testified about the video. R.488.
Once it became clear to the City that calling Ms. Stirba to testify would undoubtedly
lead to an appeal, the City abandoned the idea, even though the Court was inclined to
allow it. R.437-438. The City's hope was that testimony from Mr. Simmons would not be
as objectionable by the defense. See R.438; R.437. Simmons testified at the June 29,
2015 motion hearing that the City's intention was to finish the trial that day and the best
way to accomplish that goal was to testify himself rather than call Ms. Stirba. R.487.
Once Ms. Stirba objected so forcefully to any testimony from Mr. Simmons there was
little doubt, from the City's perspective, that the testimony could not be given without
having to contend with an appeal of that issue. R.488.
Appellant argues that intent to provoke the defense into moving for a mistrial is
evident because the City persisted in its attempt to call one of the attorneys as a witness
to address the video. Apl. Br. 28. This argument asserts that because the defense made
objections and stated its intent to move for a mistrial, the City should have simply
conceded and submitted the case to the jury without addressing what both the City and
the Court deemed an important, relevant issue for the jury to consider. By this line of
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reasoning, the Appellant is arguing that once a defendant in a trial makes an objection
and threatens to move for a mistrial, the prosecution only option would be to abandon the
course of action or risk being accused of intentionally trying to provoke a mistrial. That
argument is not supported by the law on this issue.

D.

Strategic Decisions Made by the City During and After the First Jury
Trial Were Made in Good Faith to Ethically Prosecute the Case and Do
Not Evidence Intent to Appellant into Moving for a Mistrial

The Court in Kennedy recognized that "Every act on the part of a rational prosecutor
during a trial is designed to 'prejudice' the defendant by placing before the judge or jury
~

evidence leading to a finding of his guilt. Given the complexity of the rules of evidence,
it will be a rare trial of any complexity in which some proffered evidence by the
prosecutor ... will not be found objectionable by the trial court. Kennedy, 456 U.S at 674675. Overreaching strategic decisions are easily dealt with and cured by the trial court by
simply sustaining objections. Id.
~

As is true in any jury trial, the City made certain strategic decisions throughout the
May 26, 2015 jury trial. One such decision was to propose to the Court that Ms. Stirba's
opening remarks declaring that Reyes-Gutierrez lack of intent may warrant either a
mistrial or the introduction of 404b evidence of prior convictions. R.419-420. The crux of
Appellant's argument is that the City wanted a mistrial so badly that once the request was
denied, the City devised a strategy to force the defense into making its own motion for a
mistrial. The argument overemphasizes the City's request for a mistrial.
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The City never did explicitly move for a mistrial. Rather, Mr. Simmons argued that
~

because of the assertions presented by Ms. Stirba in her opening remarks, "that either a
mistrial would be appropriate or else that the City should be able to present evidence
contrary to the assertions ... that it was a mistake or that it was human error ... by showing
evidence of prior convictions." R.420. Ms. Stirba properly argued to the Court that her
statements declaring a lack of intent were not evidence, and that a jury instruction to that
effect would be presented. R.420-421. Mr. Simmons did not argue any further and simply
submitted on the issue. R.422. Judge Trease denied the admission of prior conviction
evidence and counseled that the prosecution could address lack of any evidence regarding
intent, but to be careful as to not create a burden shift. R.422-423.
The prosecution made no further argument about a mistrial or prior conviction
evidence. Mr. Simmons' asserted at the June 29lh hearing was that once the Court deemed
a mistrial unnecessary, " ... at that point the City moved forward" and both the City and
the Court tried to find a way to present accurate evidence to the jury. R.483. Mr.
Simmons testified at that hearing that once the Court made its ruling, he didn't see
grounds for a mistrial, which is why he did not renew any argument for a mistrial. Rather,
he believed it was appropriate to have Ms. Stirba give testimony to resolve the video
issue. R.486.
Had the City wanted a mistrial so badly, as Appellant contends, Mr. Simmons would
have argued more vigorously for one. Mr. Simmons hardly argued the issue and didn't
even rebut Ms. Stirba's arguments opposing the mistrial. See R.422. Additionally, the
fact that the City proposed that Mr. Simmons testify instead of Ms. Stirba is evidence that
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the City was trying to finish the trial that day. Had the City wanted a mistrial so badly,
Simmons could have insisted that Ms. Stirba testify in spite of her clear opposition. The
Court's indication was that it would allow such testimony, and it was obvious that Ms.
Stirba found that course of action highly objectionable. The City could have simply
stipulated to a mistrial at that point rather than seeking the alternative of procuring
testimony from Mr. Simmons.
The City's filing of a 404b Notice and motion in limine to exclude mention of the
video do not constitute evidence that it was the City's intent all along to provoke the
mistrial in order to make the filings in anticipation of retrial. Mr. Simmons testified at the
June 29 th hearing that," ... frankly I was much more leery of entering into a stipulation
like we did the first time with the evidence of prior convictions." R.488. Mr. Simmons
also asserted that it made sense to make the filings on retrial to avoid the same issues that
led to the mistrial in the first place. R.488. The fact that Mr. Simmons took actions that
would avoid the same problems does not evidence intent to goad the defense into a
mistrial.

III.

This Court Should Not Disturb The Trial Court's Findings Because The
Trial Court Was Better Situated To Evaluate Whether The City Intended
To Provoke A Mistrial

As the judge presiding over first jury trial and the subsequent hearing on ReyesGutierrez's motion to bar retrial, Judge Trease was in position in which she observed the
sequence of events as they unfolded at trial. Additionally, Judge Trease heard testimony
at the June 29, 2015 hearing and was able to assess Mr. Simmons' credibility as he
testified regarding the City's intentions at trial.
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A reviewing court reviews the trial court's findings of fact for clear error, and
must give due deference to the trial court's ability to judge the credibility of the
witnesses. State v. Ashe, 145 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987); Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). It is
because of the trial court's "position of advantage to observe witnesses' demeanor and
other factors bearing on credibility," that an appellate court will not disturb the trial
court's factual assessment. Ashe at 1258. In reviewing a trial court's factual assessments,
"appellate courts must constantly have in mind that their function is not to decide factual
the issue de novo." Id; Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 395 U.S. 100, 123, 89
0j

S. Ct. 1562 ( 1969). The question for the appellate court is not whether it would decide
the issue differently than the trial court, but whether the trial court's findings go against
"the clear weight of the evidence," and such evidence leaves a "definite and firm

~

conviction that a mistake has been committed." Id; Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine
Research, 395 U.S. 100, 123, 89 S. Ct. 1562 (1969).
After hearing testimony and arguments at the June 29, 2015 hearing on ReyesGutierrez's motion to bar retrial, Judge Trease made very clear findings based on the
evidence presented at the hearing and her observations of the situation as it developed
during the trial. Judge Trease specifically found that there was no evidence of anything
"nefarious" on the part of the prosecution, nor any evidence that the prosecution acted "in
order to goad the defendant into requesting a mistrial." R.507. She found that while the
City may have made some tactical decisions during the trial, as is the case during any
trial, all parties "were doing their best to address fast moving issues" and "make the best
decisions that they could." Id.

28
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Judge Trease specifically found that the City's purpose in having Mr. Simmons
testify "was to get certain facts before the jury and not to obtain a mistrial and not to goad
the defense into making a motion for a mistrial." Id. She found legitimacy in Mr.
Simmons' explanation that the City's reasoning in stipulating to the motion for mistrial
was simply to avoid an appeal. Id.
Judge Trease made a powerful declaration during her findings at the June 29

th

hearing that appears to summarize her feelings on the issue. She declared, "I think there
are, frankly, black shadows attributed to this case that are not there." R.509. This
statement, combined with her other findings, demonstrates that Judge Trease was very
comfortable in finding that it was not the City's intent to cause a mistrial just so it could
retry the case again and better its chances of securing a conviction.
This is not a case in which Judge Trease seemed tentative or unsure about the
City's intentions. She observed the events unfold at trial and was able to view how both
the City and the defense reacted to the issues as they arose. Judge Trease was able to hear
sworn testimony from Mr. Simmons that was subjected to cross-examination from Ms.
Stirba. That testimony was found to be credible, especially when viewed in light of Judge
Trease's own observations of how the events unfolded at the May 26 th jury trial.

CONCLUSION
This Court should not disturb the factual findings of the trial court that it was not
the intention of City prosecutors to provoke a mistrial so as to afford the City a better
opportunity to convict at a subsequent trial. The trial court was well situated to observe
the events as they unfolded at the May 26, 2015 jury trial and to judge the credibility of
29
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•
Mr. Simmons' testimony at the June 29, 2015 motion hearing. The City made strategic

•

trial decisions that were intended only to provide the jury with a factual understanding
regarding the status of the surveillance video. The issue only became relevant to the case
upon testimony elicited by Ms. Stirba on cross examination, which had the effect of
misleading or confusing the jury regarding the surveillance video and the City's conduct
in relation to it. It was reasonable for the City to attempt to address the misperception

•

with the jury, and the City only stipulated to a mj strial once it had become evident that
testimony from one of the attorneys was the only viable option, and that an appeal from

•

the defense was likely inevitable if the Court allowed such testimony. Accordingly, the
trial court did not commit clear error, and its factual findings should not be disturbed .

•

SUBMITTED this 21st day of June, 2016.
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